X-Git-Url: https://code.delx.au/refind/blobdiff_plain/7d3dcb8b4f3e617d60b753757e97f16325b77f4b..7b006609c81e23ca1c7597776b7ea485932bbe0c:/docs/refind/secureboot.html diff --git a/docs/refind/secureboot.html b/docs/refind/secureboot.html index 5a10f09..d723758 100644 --- a/docs/refind/secureboot.html +++ b/docs/refind/secureboot.html @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ href="mailto:rodsmith@rodsbooks.com">rodsmith@rodsbooks.com

Originally written: 11/13/2012; last Web page update: -12/5/2012, referencing rEFInd 0.5.0

+12/6/2012, referencing rEFInd 0.5.0

I'm a technical writer and consultant specializing in Linux technologies. This Web page is provided free of charge and with no annoying outside ads; however, I did take time to prepare it, and Web hosting does cost money. If you find this Web page useful, please consider making a small donation to help keep this site up and running. Thanks!

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ href="mailto:rodsmith@rodsbooks.com">rodsmith@rodsbooks.com

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If you're using a computer that supports Secure Boot, you may run into extra complications. This feature is intended to make it difficult for malware to insert itself early into the computer's boot process. Unfortunately, it also complicates multi-boot configurations such as those that rEFInd is intended to manage. This page describes some secure boot basics and two specific aspects of rEFInd and its interactions with Secure Boot: installation issues and known bugs and limitations in rEFInd's Secure Boot features.

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If you're using a computer that supports Secure Boot, you may run into extra complications. This feature is intended to make it difficult for malware to insert itself early into the computer's boot process. Unfortunately, it also complicates multi-boot configurations such as those that rEFInd is intended to manage. This page describes some secure boot basics and two specific aspects of rEFInd and its interactions with Secure Boot: installation issues and MOK management. It concludes with a look at known bugs and limitations in rEFInd's Secure Boot features.

Basic Issues

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ href="mailto:rodsmith@rodsbooks.com">rodsmith@rodsbooks.com

Through 2012, it became obvious that Secure Boot would be a feature that was controlled, to a large extent, by Microsoft. This is because Microsoft requires that non-server computers that display Windows 8 logos ship with Secure Boot enabled. As a practical matter, this also means that such computers ship with Microsoft's keys in their firmware. In the absence of an industry-standard body to manage the signing of Secure Boot keys, this means that Microsoft's key is the only one that's more-or-less guaranteed to be installed on the computer, thus blocking the ability to boot any OS that lacks a boot path through Microsoft's signing key.

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Fortunately, Microsoft will sign third-party binaries with their key. A payment of $99 to Verisign enables a software distributor to sign as many binaries as desired. Red Hat (Fedora), Novell (SUSE), and Canonical (Ubuntu) have all announced plans to take advantage of this system. Unfortunately, using a third-party signing service is an awkward solution for open source software. In fact, for this very reason Red Hat has developed a program that it calls shim that essentially shifts the Secure Boot "train" from Microsoft's proprietary "track" to one that's more convenient for open source authors. Shim is signed by Microsoft and redirects the boot process to another boot loader that can be signed with keys that the distribution maintains and that are built into shim. Fedora 18 is expected to use this system. SUSE has announced that it will use the same system, as does Ubuntu with version 12.10 and later. SUSE has contributed to the shim approach by supporting a set of keys that users can maintain themselves. These keys are known as Machine Owner Keys (MOKs), and managing them is described later, in Managing MOKs. To reiterate, then, there are potentially three ways to sign a binary that will get it launched on a system that uses shim:

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Fortunately, Microsoft will sign third-party binaries with their key. A payment of $99 to Verisign enables a software distributor to sign as many binaries as desired. Red Hat (Fedora), Novell (SUSE), and Canonical (Ubuntu) have all announced plans to take advantage of this system. Unfortunately, using a third-party signing service is an awkward solution for open source software. In fact, for this very reason Red Hat has developed a program that it calls shim that essentially shifts the Secure Boot "train" from Microsoft's proprietary "track" to one that's more friendly to open source authors. Shim is signed by Microsoft and redirects the boot process to another boot loader that can be signed with keys that the distribution maintains and that are built into shim. Fedora 18 is expected to use this system. SUSE has announced that it will use the same system, as does Ubuntu with version 12.10 and later. SUSE has contributed to the shim approach by providing expansions to shim that support a set of keys that users can maintain themselves. These keys are known as Machine Owner Keys (MOKs), and managing them is described later, in Managing MOKs. To reiterate, then, there are potentially three ways to sign a binary that will get it launched on a system that uses shim:

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My focus in testing rEFInd's Secure Boot capabilities has been on getting Linux kernels with EFI stub loaders to launch correctly.

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My focus in testing rEFInd's Secure Boot capabilities has been on getting Linux kernels with EFI stub loaders to launch correctly. I've done some minimal testing with GRUB 2, though. I've also tested some self-signed binaries, such as an EFI shell and MokManager. (The EFI shell launches, but will not itself launch anything that's not been signed with a UEFI Secure Boot key. This of course limits its utility.)

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At the moment, I consider rEFInd's shim/MOK support to be of alpha quality. I'm releasing it in this state in the hope of getting feedback from adventurous early adopters. I expect the improve the installation procedure, and with any luck fix some of the known bugs, in the next couple of versions. Some of the usability improvements are dependent upon MOK-capable versions of shim being released with major distributions; such versions of shim, with kernels signed with the key that matches the one built into shim, will greatly reduce the need for users to sign boot loaders.

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At the moment, I consider rEFInd's shim/MOK support to be of alpha quality. I'm releasing it in this state in the hope of getting feedback from adventurous early adopters. I expect to improve the installation procedure, and with any luck fix some of the known bugs, in the next couple of versions. Some of the usability improvements are dependent upon MOK-capable versions of shim being released with major distributions; such versions of shim, with kernels signed with the key that matches the one built into shim, will greatly reduce the need for users to sign boot loaders.